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HlTRODUCTION
~-

Appellants Donald

Dyson and L.

F.

Dyson & Associates

reply to the Briefs of Respondents ADA and Ranger Insurance
cornpanj ancl Respondents l·:cslC'r,
and Feruuson as

Hissell, 11cClain, Oborn, 1"/alker

'ollo'->'S.

II.
REPLY TO .\OA AciD FANGER

A.

INSURAtJCE Cot1PANY

The Shannon endorsement should be issued as a
matter of la•v.

Respondents'

aryunent that no endorsement to add Shannon

as a co'"erecJ pilot •nissc.~

the c-c•int of _.·,r-·rellants'

appeal,
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.!ad all
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~"•''i''.'.:"_~t_!_ccc

,. 1 ,,;t' t._·

l-1:-...t

tilE·

L1:,1•:.tl

l ('

t!'"!e Shannon endorsement.

l·'•r3l

sln~.._,e
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was that it had never been received.

The trial court acknowledged

the deficiency in proof of mailing sufficient to raise a presumption of receipt when it received AOA's file copy of the memo in
evidence by stating, "I would say this,

the acceptance of the

exhi~:

I would not interpret it as sayiJ1g, as proof you received it."
(R.

632).

C.

The U.C.C. is not applicable to the transaction in
question.

An examination of Title 70A, Uniform Co1®1crcial Code, will
reveal that it purports to deal with limited and specific types
of transactions, e.g.:
Chapter 2, Sales;
Chapter 3, Commercial Paper;
Chapter 4, Bank Deposits & Collections;
Chapter 5, Letters of Credit;
Chapter 6, Bulk Transfers;
Chapter 7, Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and
Other Documents of Title;
Chapter 8, Investment Securities; and
Chapter 9, Secured Transactions.
The section relied upon by Respondents,

70A-l-L0S(4),

within Chapter l, entitled General Provisions.
language in the general provisions ot

is contained

To contend that sorr'

the cnrlc ,·lp[d ics to types of

transactions not covered by the c•Jde is a s t rd i nP<l at trel'lpt at
statutory construction not worthy o

I'

those Hhn

urc1c

it.

even if one assumes that the qenc:ral p1·0visi"ns of thr'

Hoviever,
cor]f:'

apply

inSponsored
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cf

agent-principal law arc not to be

:;receding section of the code,

abrog~ted

by the code.

A

§70/\-l-103 states:

"Supplementary general principles of law applicable.
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
act, the principles of law and equity, including the
law merchant an0 the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other
validating or invalidating cause shall supplement
its provisions."
Therefore, even if the Uniform Commercial Code is applicable
to the present situation, it does not preclude appellants' contention that AOA's acknowledged policy of backdating endorsements to
the date of request conferred upon appellants an apparent authority
to bind the insurer.
Subsection §70/\-l-205 I 3), which immediately precedes the
subsection that respondents rely upon, states:
"A course of dealinn between parties and any usage of
trade in the vocation or trade in which they are
engaged or of which they are or should be aware give
particular meaninu to and supplement or qualify terms
of an aoreement."
It is clear that respondents'

consisten~

and acknowledged

practice of backdating the endorsements to the date of request was
a "course of Llealinq betv1een the parties" v.'ith which respondents
~·ere

totally fafl'iliar.

It is obvious from the literal words of the

statute that this well-established course of dealing "supplement[s]
or qual if~· l i,_,s]

'·
311

tcrn1s of

State
llL1h

3ro

aqrren1ent."

~utofl'obile

and

Casualt~·

Underwriters, 487 P.2d

19'1).

Respondents fail
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to point out that the Court in Barnett relied explicitly on the
applicable provisions of the Utah Insurance Code which control all
contracts for insurance in this state.

In the present case, the

issue involves an agency contract, not an insurance contract.
Additionally, in the Barnett case, the Court specifically noted
that the evidence produced at trial demonstrated that the custom
asserted by the plaintiffs was disputed by the defendants.

In the

present case, there is no contention by the respondents that they
did not have a practice of backdating endorsements to an existing
policy.

In fact, Mr. Tom Dougherty, a senior Vice-President at

specifically acknowledged that this was the practice of AOA
E.

A~

(R. 6121

Respondents'own actions have created an ambiguity.

Respondents also set forth Ephraim Theatre Co. v.

Hawk, 321

P.2d 221 (Utah 1958), a case of an action to recover rent, as the
"rule for interpretation of contracts".

(Respondents' Brief, p. 22

In the Ephraim case, the Court found absolutely no ambiguity in the
contract.

However, in

a

later case, involving a dispute over the

terms of an employment contract, the Court again addressed the isso
of contract interpretation in the following language:
"In Hardinge Co. v. Eimco Corp., [26fi P.2d 494 (Utah 1954)]
this court stated that in the int~rpret~tion of contracts,
the interpretation given by the parties themselves as
shown by their acts will be aclopterl by the court.
(lie
think this should be:
will be regarded as advisory.)
In Bullough v. Sims [400 P.2J 20 (Utah 1965)] this
court explained that when parties place their own
construction on their agreement and so perform, the
court may consider this as persuasivEC e•;idcnce of what
their true intention was.
It is Lruc that the doctrine
of practical construction may be appli<?d only when
the contract is ambiguous; but thr· '!'Jest inn bc-contes
ambiguous to whom? l'lhere the: pdrtic·s lta"e dcmonstr-atc,cJ
by their actions a:HJ [-'er'nrl'Jarwe t!tdl to l!ll_-r'' the·
contract
meant
,1iflcby r•;nt,
the
mcdttrnq
Sponsored
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a situation, the parties by their actions have created
the ambiguity to bring the rule into operation.
If
this were not the rule, the courts would be enforcing
one contract when both parties have demonstrated that
they meant and intended to the contract to be quite
different."
Bullfroa Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, SOl P.2d
266 (Utah 1972).
Respondents,
~dorsements,

by their own undisputed practice of backdating

have clearly shown the meaning they themselves have

placed upon the terms of the agency contract, or that they initially
~reed
~r

to modify it by the course of their conduct.

I t is difficult

appellants to understand how respondents, after engaging in this

8ractice since October 1970

(R.507-Sll), which plainly demonstrates

the meaning respondents placed on the tenDs of the agency contract,
can now assert that they never intended to be bound by their own

practices
F.

and policies.
Respondents cannot dist1nguish away the case

~f

Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Co., 239 A.2d 4
(N.J.

1969).

Through a careful,
SJpreme Court's opinion,
~e

self-serving

e~iting

of the New Jersey

respondents point out that in Travelers

agent alleged that the company had expressly modified the agency

, aareement,

granting the aaent binding authority.

Yet the Court

specifically stated in its anecllysis of the facts that "[lv]e accept
t~e premise that Travelers ne1·er 1n so many \vords authorized the

acents to bind a risk

in that c'atecJory."

Id. at 6.

Respondents

Jlso atter;1pt t0 assert that the TLlvelers c'ourt implied that the
J·Jthorization to the :tc'U1t \·"ls omlnauous ancl that this is not true

ln the present case.

(Rcspnndc'nts'

Brief 25 and 26).

c'le:r:JC_avclers cusc clc:trh· points uut,

However, as

the ambiguity was created by
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the company's repeated policy of backdating policies, not by the
terms of the written agreement.

Those circumstances in Travelers

which led the court to its conclusion that the agent had apparent
authority to bind the company parallel the circumstances found in
the present situation, i.e., a clear practice of backdating endorsements grants the agent the authority to bind the company on endorsements to existing policies, a fact admitted by Mr.

I'
!

Dougherty.

Also, respondents assert that the holdino of the Travelers
case was based on a theory of modification which ca:,not apply to
this case.

Yet, respondents ignore the clearly stated holding

of Travelers court:
"We prefer to hold that a practice of backdatin•r policies
to the date requested in the application implies, as
between principal and agent, authority in the agent
to bind a risk pendinq the principal's decision on the
application."
Id. at 9.
The practice of backdating policies was without doubt the basis
for the holding in Travelers.

That exact practice is unarguably the

practice on which appellants relied in the present case.

That

practice was instituted by the respondents and was in effect since
October, 1970.

To allow the respondents to now disavow this practice

would clearly lead to an unfair ancl inequitable: rcs11lt.
G.

Respondents'

argument_':l!lc~e_r _I'r~~:l_T_'/ ~~--ci_"l1oot_s_1_:c.CC!E"

argument that beqs __:t:_h_c_i~s_c_~~ __l_[1.'1_U('~':'llon.
Respondents state that "the tr1al

court t.cld that:

Ranger had not accepted the ri,;k on Shannron ,1s
endorsement was specifically macle nor

Wil';

,,

cJ

pi l<Jt

cou rs•·

shown to impliedly cover Shannon", c,v,•r](}nk1n:J tlt<c

<J

f

1-,l,_

l\01\

an<i

:-;ince no
conduct
that
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:lr. Dougherty admitted the

practici'O in question.

Interestingly,

respondents do not attempt to Justify the reasons given by AOA's
claims department for denying coverage of the loss.
~t
0r

The issue is

whether Shannon had been endorsed on the policy, but whether
not under the acknowledged "backdating" practice, ne should have
The claims department was silent on the issue.

been end or sed.
Likewise,
~ner

the other reason given,

that Dyson was not the sole

of the aircraft is without merit, since the application for the

insurance does not even request such information, and in any event,
~son

still had a security interest ln tne aircrafL at the time

of the loss.

AOA/Ranger's stated reasons for denial of coverage

are nothing more than a bad faith attempt to deny coverage under a
fact

situation

where they would have "backdated" the requested

endorsement and charged a premium therefor if the loss had not
occurred before they had processed the requested endorsement.
III.

REPLY TO
A.

RFSPO~DENTS

KESLER,

E~

AL.

Appellants' appeal of the judgment in favor of
respondents Kesler, et al., was not for the purpose
of delay.

Utah Rule of Civil Pr0cedure 73(1)

provides, in pertinent

part:
"on the> trial of the c-ause on apl)eal, if it appears
to the court that the appeal was made solely for
delay, 1 t rno:· a,l,! to the c·.·st s such clamageas may
be just, not exccectino twenty-five percent of
the J u,1qp1cnt atc:occll ·"l 'r<)n:."
(Emphasis adcled).
i\t the tr1ol,
·,:~lch

til'-' pal·tics entered into a stipulation in

the o:•son ,·,,JCelk·:· dc!mittc•,[ lia!Jili.ty to saicl plaintiffs

(Kesler,
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et al.) "if no insurance coverage was found to exist".
court's Memorandum Decision, p. 4 (emphasis added).

Trial

The trial

court found that no insurance coverage did exist and that, therefore,
the Dyson Agency breached its contract with the plaintiffs Kesler,
et al.

The Dyson Agency has appealed that decision to this Court.

If this Court finds that AOA should have issued an endorsement coven:.:
Shannon or a pilot as requested, and, therefore, that insurance
coverage did indeed exist

brea~~

in law, then Dyson would not have

his contract with the plaintiffs Kesler, et al., and the trial
court's ruling that the Dyson Agency breached its contract with the
plaintiffs Kesler, et al. would be erroneous and there would be no
grounds for liability of the Dyson defendants to the plaintiffs.
It is clear from these facts that Dysons' appeal from the
judgment against them in favor of the plaintiffs is not "made solely
for delay" but rather, to the contrary, because there are genuine
issues of law concerning the liability between Dysons and the
plaintiffs to be resolved by this Court.

Furthermore, the Dyson

Agency, in compliance with Rule 73 (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
has filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of $30,000.00, which
further evidences Dysons' intent to meet any final judgment

render~

against them.
The appellants Kesler, et al. assert that Rule 7'3 (l)
to Rule 38, Federal Rules of Appellate
Federal cases which applied this rule.

Procedur~

is simik

I

and cite several

Federal Rule 38 states:

"If a court of appeals shall determine that an appeal
is frivolous, it may award just clamaqes anc1 sinqle
or double costs to the appellee."
Sponsored by
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I

difference.

Unlike the Federal Rule, the Utah Rule allows damages

only if the appeal was made for the sole purpose of delay while the
broader Federal Rule extends to all frivolous appeals.

The issues

raised on appeal by the appellants clearly show tbat the appeal
was not taken solely for delay, but because appellants contend that
the trial court erred and that insurance coverage did exist as a
matter of law for the loss in question and, therefore, appellants
should not be held liable to the Kesler, et al. respondents.
Additionally, it should be noted that the plaintiffs Kesler,
et al. have cross-appealed the decision of the trial court.

By

asking for additional damages from this court they are in effect
requesting this court to have the Dyson Agency pay for their own
independent appeal.
B.

The trial court did not err in denying plaincrff
respondents' attorneys fees in this action.

It is well settled in Utah that a party cannot recover
attorney's fees from an opposing party without an express contractual
Stubbs

or statutory duty for the opposing party to pay such fees.
v. Hemmert,

567 P.2d 168

(Utah 1977)

Plaintiffs Kesler, et al.

relies on Pacific Coast 'T'itle Co. v. Hartford, 325 P.2d 906
1958) to support their claim for attorney's fees.

(Utah

The issue in that

case was whether a party was entitled to recover attorney's fees
from an opposing party in an action aqainst a third party brought
about as a direct result of the oprosing party's breach.

In that

case, the plaintiff, a title insurance company, issued title insurance
Policy for hor1es beinq built b\' a contractor.
reguirefllents,

Due to the financing

these polici<.'s \,·ere issued before the rights of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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materialmen and laborers had been concluded.

For that very

reason, the title company was the named obligee on a bond issued by
the defendants which stated that the title company would be saved
harmless from defaults on the part of the contractor.

The con tractor

failed to meet its obligations to its subcontractors and materialmen
who filed liens and subsequently attempted to foreclose the liens.
The title company, due to its obligation to keep the titles unencumbered, had an obligation to defend against these liens.
The court found that this series of events could reasonably
be foreseen and that the defendant's bond was issued specifically to
protect the title company from that type of loss.

In the present

case, the trial court specifically found that the plaintiff's
attorney's fees were fees claimed within the plaintiff's action
itself.

(Memorandum Decision, 19).
The plaintiffs claim that they were "forced to participate in

the lawsuit because of their being moving parties in initiating the
action and because they could not be released from attendance at
the trial"

(Plaintiffs' Brief, p.

9).

However,

plaintiffs fail to

point out that Dyson hi~self was a party to the orioinal suit filed
against AOA and that after the plaintiffs filed suit aoainst Dyson
personally and the Dyson .'lc:ency,

thee·

tinue their o\,'Tl clail" aoainst .;oo,.

inde:Jendentl~·

electec to con-

1~\e:'lorandumf\pirlion,

;:o. 19).

The plaintiffs ~ade this election 'lespite the s'=l:J\llcttion aG:ceed to
by Dyson that admitted liability to th~ "laint1~;s i: no ins~rance
coverage was found to exist.
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cLum against D·;son,

::.dr

slnce no matter v;hat occurred in the

between Dj'son and J,OA/P.anger,

SJlt

the rlaintiffs would recover

:Jnages for the loss of the aircraft, either from Dyson or from
:an'jer.

c.

The trial court did not err in denying plaintiffs
interest incurred on their Walker Bank note.

There is no better settled rule of law than that the measure
,. damages for a breach of contract is that v:hich puts the non:reaching rarty in as good pos1tion as he would have been had there
;;oen no breach.

Even accertino,

:?69).

Deseret Mortuary Co., 455 P.2d 197

Keller v.

arguendo,

(Utah

the trial court's decision that

:1·son did breach the contract h'ith the plaintiffs, there is no
~;bt

that the plaintiffs would have had to ray the interest on

:~note

to Kalker Bank & Trust Conpany .

The plaintiffs were obligors

. :.C:er this note and the lnsurance CO'.'erage \vhich they sought through
::,c D:;son Aoency h·as <"or the •:alue of the aircraft,

not for the

·o.Le of their debt obligations.
PlaintiFfs'
.:.C:er the note he,

araument that since Dyson was a joint obligor
in effect,

has agreed to pay the higher rate of

::Jterest is totall"' S[)Urious anc fri'.'Olous.

This argument conveni-

o:J:l"· overlooks the ob\·ious fact that on the original note the
=~ai:.':l:'fs ··:ere also cJblu:ors ,_,ho ha:1 aareecl
-~.>2

to pay their share of

:~.:.e~cst.

~~~e~t that

o~--:c

~... r.n

Sl,;rts

:1

;1.1:"to

~lS

an~
~3

'-J.

lOl:Jt

~~at

obli~.._-:or

aarees to pay

the other JOint obligors

none.
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This court has specifically stated that when a party breaches
a contract to repay a sum certain, "the measure of the damages for
such a breach would ordinarily have been the legal rate of interest
allowable for such non-performance".
2d 291, 312 P.2d 777 (1957).

Reed v. Armstrong, 6 Utah

To hold that Dyson is liable for

interest damages beyond that amount would clearly be an award of
punitive damages against Dyson for breach of contract.
IV.
SUMMARY
For the reasons set forth in appellants' Brief, the judgment
of the trial court in favor of AOA/Ranger should be reversed since
the trial court erred in not applying the legal principals set
forth in Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Company, 239 A.2d 4 (N.J. 1968)
to the facts of this case and AOA's reasons for denial of coverage
amount to nothing more than a bad faith attempt to avoid coverage
under an endorsement AOA should have issued, and eventually would
have issued, had not the loss occurred before processing had been
completed.
The trial court's judgment denying the Walker Bank interest
as an item of damages should be affirmed since the purchasers of
the aircraft (plaintiffs/respondents) would have had to pay the
Walker Bank interest, even if there had been no loss, and, thus,
no question regarding insurance coverage ever raised.
Likewise, the trial court's denial of attorney's fees as an
item of damages was proper since there was no agreement between
the parties regarding the payment of fees necessary to suoport such
an award.
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Appellants did not undertake this appeal for the purposes
of delay, but for the bona fide purpose of contesting the trial
oourt's judgment in favor of AOA/Ranqer, which appellants verily
~lieve

to be erroneous, and,

?ule 73(1), U.R.C.P.,

therefore, no penalty under

should be assessed against appellants, even

:f this Court were to sustain the judgment in favor of AOA/Ranger,

·,·,·hich appellants pray should be reversed.
\\THEREFORE, appellants pray that this Honorable Court reverse
:he judgment of the trial court by directing that judgment be entered
:n favor of Donald A.

Dyson against AOA/Ranqer on plaintiffs'

:omplaint, or that judgment be entered in favor of Donald A.
lnd L. F.

Dyson

&

Dyson

Associates on their Counterclaim against AOA/

?.anger in the amount of any judgment found in favor of the Owners
ogainst the Dy sons.
Alternatively, appellants pray that the action be remanded
to the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County
~r trial by

jury pursuant to appellants' demand therefor prior

:o the trial of this case.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January,

1979.
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